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BACKGROUND: Prenatal diagnosis based on different technologies is increasingly used in developed countries and has become a common
strategy in obstetric practice. The tests are crucial in enabling mothers to make informed decisions about the possibility of terminating pregnancy.
They have generated numerous bioethical and legal controversies in the field of ‘wrongful life’ claims (action brought by or on behalf of a child
against the mother or other people, claiming that he or she has to endure a not-worth-living existence) and ‘wrongful birth’ claims (action brought
by the mother or parents against the physician for being burdened with an unwanted, often disabled child, which could have been avoided).
OBJECTIVE AND RATIONALE: The possibility which exists nowadays to intervene actively by programming and deciding the phases
linked to procreation and birth has raised several questions worldwide. The mother’s right to self-determination could be an end but
whether or not this right is absolute is debatable. Freedom could, with time, act as a barrier that obstructs intrusion into other people’s
lives and their personal choices. Therapeutic choices may be manageable in a liberal sense, and the sanctity of life can be inflected in a
secular sense. These sensitive issues and the various points of view to be considered have motivated this review.
SEARCH METHODS: Literature searches were conducted on relevant demographic, social science and medical science databases
(SocINDEX, Econlit, PopLine, Medline, Embase and Current Contents) and via other sources. Searches focused on subjects related to
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bioethical and legal controversies in the field of preimplantation and prenatal diagnosis, wrongful birth and wrongful life. A review of the
international state of law was carried out, focusing attention on the peculiar issue of wrongful life and investigating the different jurisdictional
solutions of wrongful life claims in a comparative survey.
OUTCOMES: Courts around the world are generally reluctant to acknowledge wrongful life claims due to their ethical and legal implica-
tions, such as existence as an injury, the right not to be born, the nature of the harm suffered and non-existence as an alternative to a dis-
abled life. Most countries have rejected such actions while at the same time approving those for wrongful birth. Some countries, such as
France with a law passed in March 2002, have definitively excluded Wrongful Life action. Only in the Netherlands and in three states of
the USA (California, Washington and New Jersey) are Wrongful Life actions allowed. In other countries, such as Belgium, legislation is
unclear because, despite a first decision of the Court allowing Wrongful Life action, the case is still in progress. There is a complete lack of
case law regarding wrongful conception, wrongful birth and wrongful life in a few countries, such as Estonia.
WIDER IMPLICATIONS: The themes of ‘wrongful birth’ and ‘wrongful life’ are charged with perplexing ethical dilemmas and raise deli-
cate legal questions. These have met, in various countries and on certain occasions, with different solutions and have triggered ethical and
juridical debate. The damage case scenarios result from a lack of information or diagnosis prior to the birth, which deprives the mother of
the chance to terminate the pregnancy.
Key words: wrongful life / wrongful birth / international law / preimplantation diagnosis / prenatal screening / medical liability / human
rights
Introduction
Prenatal diagnosis (PD) using different technologies (foetal ultrasonog-
raphy, genetic screening, laboratory tests, etc.) is increasingly used to
explore the health and genetic conditions of unborn children and to
inform expectant mothers of potential foetal anomalies and diseases that
may create physical, psychological, and social harm to parents and fam-
ilies. In developed countries, there has been truly outstanding progress in
prenatal diagnostic methods. These, however, have generated numerous
bioethical and legal controversies and issues (Pelias, 1986; Strong, 2003;
Crockin, 2005; Chervenak and McCullough, 2011; Amagwula et al.,
2012; Chadwick and Childs, 2012; Berceanu et al., 2014; de Jong et al.,
2015; Dondorp and van Lith, 2015).
When introduced, prenatal investigations such as invasive genetic
diagnosis (Druzin et al., 1993), second-trimester ultrasound screening
(Chervenak et al., 1989), and first-trimester risk assessment (Chasen
et al., 2001) appeared controversial. They have since, however,
become common strategies in obstetric practice (Ewigman et al.,
1990; Wald, 2002; O’Brien et al., 2015).
Several parties are directly involved in prenatal diagnostic practice,
i.e. the mother/parents, the foetus or newborn and finally the peri-
natal medicine practitioners.
Unlike the majority of diagnostic activities in medicine, the condi-
tions, in most cases, cannot be cured or alleviated. Following an
undesired result, the only option therefore is to decide whether to
accept the child’s condition and prepare for the birth or to terminate
the pregnancy (Gekas et al., 2016). Consequently, the main reason
for offering prenatal genetic testing is to enhance the reproductive
autonomy of the woman and/or couple with regard to parenting or
preventing the birth of a child with a serious disorder or disability
(DiSilvestro, 2009; Schmitz et al., 2009; Wright and Chitty, 2009;
Deans et al., 2015; Wilkinson, 2015). In other words, PD technolo-
gies are crucial to enable mothers to make an informed decision as
to whether or not to terminate the pregnancy (Hewison, 2015).
From another point of view, the duty to give appropriate information
in order to obtain informed consent is placed on the medical
professionals. The question, in fact, arises as to whether or not physicians
are obliged: to disclose the availability of prenatal tests to eligible patients
as part of the physician–patient discussion about prenatal screening and
diagnosis, to explain the risk of false-positive and false-negative test
results and the uncertain implications of results and finally, to fully inform
the patient about the results of the tests themselves. It is presumed that
new medical techniques in the area of prenatal testing are used to give a
pregnant patient as much information as possible concerning the health
of her foetus. What course of action is taken thereafter is left entirely up
to the patient and is essentially a personal choice. Giving the mother/
parents the opportunity to make such a decision based on all of the avail-
able, accurate information is the primary responsibility of the prenatal
counsellor. If an error occurs in giving or interpreting the test, the phys-
ician may be faced with an extremely delicate situation, engaging his/her
moral and legal responsibility. Mothers/parents who seek prenatal coun-
selling expect to receive accurate information regarding the health of the
foetus. If they are reassured by a medical practitioner as to the health of
the foetus and the child is subsequently born with an anomaly or disease,
the parents have effectively been deprived of their right to make an
informed decision about whether to terminate or continue the preg-
nancy. Failure may occur by omission or failed communication of pertin-
ent information to the parents or by an alleged error in the
interpretation of the diagnostic information (Klein and Mahoney, 2007;
Frati et al., 2014; Toews and Caulfield, 2014).
In this article, we firstly explore the bioethical debate surrounding the
issue of preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) and PD. We then focus
on the peculiar issues of wrongful birth and wrongful life, investigating
the different jurisdictional solutions of wrongful life claims in a compara-
tive survey, and laying bare some of the ethical issues involved. Finally,
the ethical views regarding these controversial matters are delineated.
This review suggests new frontiers for obstetric decision-making.
When we discuss maternal and foetal interests in an ethical context,
one of the most critical issues is that of balancing the mother’s right to self-
determination and autonomy with the best interests of the unborn child
(Munthe, 2015). Ethical dilemmas arise from what are often described as
‘maternal–foetal conflicts’ (Mahowald, 1993; Steinbock, 1994).
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Firstly, as part of the bioethical debate underlines, this locution
perpetuates the premise that the foetus, like the pregnant woman, is
a person, whose interests and rights must be protected (Flagler et al.,
1997). Again, the expression ‘maternal–foetal conflicts’ evokes an
opposition between maternal and foetal rights and seems to imply
that the nature and status of the foetus are not in doubt.
Upon birth, a baby is considered to acquire both moral and legal
standing as a separate person. However, prior to birth, does the foetus
have independent interests from the mother? Can it claim rights against
its mother? Foetal rights doctrines grant implicit legal status to the
unborn child, assuming that the foetus is a full human being from the
moment of conception. Other opposing positions accord the foetus no
moral or legal standing (Isaacs, 2003). Only if the foetus is considered a
person, can rights and conflicts with another person, like the mother,
arise. There can be no conflict without rights (Yeo and Lim, 2011).
What constitutes a right is a further complex question (Savulescu, 2002;
Hafner, 2011). If we assume that the foetus is a person and that foetal
rights exist, women’s and foetal rights may be difficult to reconcile, mak-
ing it possible for the rights of a zygote, embryo or foetus to trump
those of a pregnant woman in certain circumstances (Uberoi and de
Bruyn, 2013). Taking the opposite view, others argue that a foetus has
no moral status independent of its mother (Isaacs, 2003).
In this context, we believe that it is critical to distinguish between
the legal and moral rights of the foetus and the concept of ‘best
interest’ of both mother and unborn child. In making the complex
link between rights and interests, it could be stressed that rights pro-
tect interests (Savulescu, 2002). An example immediately comes to
mind, the right not to be born would exists if a child had an interest
in not being born (Jecker, 2012). In the framework of ethical dilem-
mas that arise during pregnancy, some argue that there can be
opposition between maternal and foetal rights, as the autonomy and
self-determination of most women may conflict with the ‘best inter-
est of the foetus’. If, in recent decades, respect for the autonomy
and self-determination of all people (including pregnant women) has
become an accepted ethical principle in every field of medicine, it
appears to be inextricably linked with the principle of beneficence
(and that of non-maleficence), presuming that everyone (pregnant
woman, couples and physicians) act in the best interests of the foe-
tus. In general, we can say that the pregnant woman makes decisions
that are ‘in the interests’ of the foetus and, prospectively, of the
child (Jonsen, 1988; Watt, 2016). However, in some circumstances,
the principle of respect for the pregnant woman’s autonomy may
collide with the principles of beneficence and/or non-maleficence
toward the foetus. Once again, principles are difficult to reconcile,
and it is essential to avoid the risk of fulfilling a moral obligation of
beneficence towards the foetus at the expense of maternal auton-
omy. Our personal view is that alleged foetal rights cannot be ele-
vated over the rights of the pregnant woman and that the woman’s
autonomy and right to self-determination should override the ‘rights’
and interests of her foetus, provided she is fully and adequately
informed and competent to make a decision.
Methods
Literature searches were conducted on relevant demographic, social sci-
ence and medical science databases (SocINDEX, Econlit, PopLine,
Medline, Embase and Current Contents) and via other sources. Searches
focused on subjects related to bioethical and legal controversies in the
field of PGD and PD, wrongful birth and wrongful life. A review of the
international state of law was carried out, focusing attention on the pecu-
liar issue of wrongful life and investigating the different jurisdictional solu-
tions of wrongful life and birth claims in a comparative survey.
PGD: bioethical considerations
The constant evolution of scientific progress has permitted us to
exceed the boundaries of what was once considered the natural cycle
of life, posing several ethical dilemmas that are not easy to solve
(Kushnir et al., 2016). Intervening actively, by planning and deciding
the phases linked to procreation and birth, is nowadays possible
(Dondorp and de Wert, 2011; Hens et al., 2013; Harper et al.,
2014). These are complex times in which the rights of the couple are
intertwined with the rights of the foetus, with the interests of each
connected in various ways to planned parenthood and ultimately to
the attainment of life, but only on certain conditions. The legitimate
expectations of becoming parents are balanced against the greater or
lesser protection, often unsuccessful, of an entity that is not yet a
person. The ethical and legal debate is intense and in continuous evo-
lution, and in tension with the attribution of individual control and
widespread acknowledgement of the principle of self-determination.
Procreation and birth introduce responsibilities that were once not
even imaginable, obliging the judge and the ethicist to modify their atti-
tudes to, if not life itself, at least the quality of life. With prenatal screen-
ing and even more so, preimplantation diagnosis, the decision, to
become parents no matter what or instead to subordinate this desire
to the birth of a healthy child, is left to the parents themselves. In the
absence of well-defined legislation, which would be the preferable
option, it is important to at least reach, if possible, a shared ethical deci-
sion with a scale of values that can guide the lawfulness of choices
(Dondorp and van Lith, 2015; Lowther et al., 2015; Wasserman, 2015).
The suffering and hardships that a disabled life entails can be rejected
by preventing the birth event itself. They could also be alleviated through
compensation, thus attributing the responsibility to others. But who is
able to evaluate the quality of life of someone born with a disability? And
therefore, who can legitimately initiate legal proceedings in order to
obtain relief? These are just some of the many questions raised by the
issue of prenatal and preimplantation diagnosis.
In today’s society, there is a widespread feeling that it is not life that
should be protected at all costs, but the quality of life. This view would
seem to be in direct opposition to the concept of the ‘sanctity of life’.
Consequently, the approach to such a delicate issue cannot disregard the
sensitivity underlying those ethical values which should serve as coordi-
nates. These issues have been the matter of a lively doctrinal, regulatory
and juridical debate all over the world (Molinelli et al., 2012; Propping and
Schott, 2014; Brezina and Kutteh, 2015; de Jong and de Wert, 2015).
The possibility of carrying out PGD for couples who have resorted to
assisted reproduction has been a matter of debate in several countries
(Boggio and Corbellini, 2009). This practice consists in the collection of
cell samples from the embryo before its implantation in the mother’s
womb in order to verify its state of health and, above all, the presence
of any genetic disorders (Gulino et al., 2013; Zuradzki, 2014; Durland,
2015; Hu et al., 2015; Capalbo et al. 2016; Chang et al. 2016; Irion and
Irion, 2016). In several countries, including Italy, the right to preimplanta-
tion diagnosis, for couples who had resorted to in vitro fertilization
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techniques, was not recognized from the start (Turillazzi and Fineschi,
2008; Busardò et al., 2014; Turillazzi et al., 2015). In several cases,
besides the prohibition of any kind of preimplantation diagnosis for
eugenic purposes, it has been stressed that any investigations carried out
should be ‘observational’. This, then, rules out invasive studies, such as
those that involve the collection of cell samples.
Such positions have fuelled the debate, in particular, on the balan-
cing of interests between the protection of the embryo on the one
hand and, on the other, the protection of the mother’s health and
the couple’s right to know the state of health of the embryo itself. In
particular, it may be debatable to prohibit the assessment of possible
anomalies or genetic disorders through an investigation of the
embryo which is not yet implanted in the womb while legalizing the
PD of the foetus. The latter procedure is clearly more aggressive
than preimplantation genetic diagnosis and may lead to the termin-
ation of pregnancy, which may be both physically painful and mentally
distressing for the mother.
Recently, however, there has been a tendency to recognize the
parents’ right to access preimplantation diagnosis techniques.
Among the most important arguments raised in this respect, it is
worth mentioning: (i) the parents’ right to be informed as to the
state of health of the embryo to be implanted, in accordance with
the general principle of informed consent required for all medical
treatment; (ii) the necessity to protect the mother’s right to health
since the implantation of a malformed embryo or of one carrying
genetic disorders cannot only cause psychological distress to the
mother but could also increase the risk of pregnancy complications
or miscarriage; and (iii) the problematic nature of the ban on PGD,
in view of the mother’s right to carry out genetic analysis and diagno-
sis on the already formed foetus (through the amniocentesis and
chorionic villus sampling techniques) and subsequently to interrupt
pregnancy.
Undoubtedly, the application of PGD raises controversial and
highly debated ethical problems (Robertson, 2003, 2005; De Wert,
2005; Soini et al., 2006; Basille et al., 2009; Hens et al., 2013; De
Wert, et al., 2014; Whetstine, 2015). Aside from the moral status of
the embryo, debates concerning the acceptability of PGD have
included the potential biological impact as well as moral, political and
religious values. It should be borne in mind that ethical concerns
relating to PGD are strictly intertwined with religious values and
beliefs, cultural and social backgrounds, and lived experience and
emotions (Gebhart et al., 2016). As in other fields of predictive pre-
natal medicine, heterogeneous positions may exist, depending on
whether a human being, defined as a person, is considered as coming
into existence at the time of fertilization or as gradually acquiring the
full status of a human being during intrauterine development.
In this regard, similarities and differences can be drawn with regard
to PD. For those who believe that the foetus is not a person, there
seem to be differences in the ethical justification between the two
procedures, PGD and PD. PGD may be psychologically less distres-
sing for the mother and the couple who may feel more detached
from an embryo on a petri dish compared to a foetus growing inside
the womb. In the same way, for those who attribute moral status to
the embryo, both PGD and PD are unacceptable. With this hypoth-
esis, there are also slight differences between the two procedures:
one might argue, for example that in PGD the ethical disvalue can be
greater because more embryos are created, by assisted procreation
methods, and then destroyed while, in general, in PD followed by an
abortion, only one foetus is aborted. Yet again, since a moral value can
be attributed to pregnancy itself, some might consider PGD to be ethic-
ally more acceptable than PD since, in the former, the pregnancy has
not yet begun (Cameron and Williamson, 2003; Bartha et al., 2006).
It has been said that PGD is morally singular due to the fact that
patients and clinicians are involved in creating a new life, which also
entails responsibility for the welfare of the future child (Hens et al.,
2013). PGD is a part of the complex debate surrounding ‘procreative
beneficence’ that states that if selection of an embryo is reasonably
possible, then couples have a moral obligation to select the embryo
whose life can be expected to be the best quality (Savulescu, 2001,
2007; Savulescu and Kahane, 2009; Rodriguez-Purata et al., 2015).
This concept in itself, has raised many ethical controversies (Bennett,
2014; Petersen, 2015). Furthermore, from the advantages of predict-
ive medicine to the risk of genetic discrimination, choices may
become more and more difficult and controversial (Aurenque, 2015;
Mertes and Hens, 2015). From the standpoint of ethical speculation,
there are many points of discussion. The ethical and moral accept-
ability of PGD, which has a specific burden (e.g. risk of eventual
embryo loss and costs of the procedure), may depend on the benefit
of avoiding the conception of an affected child. In other words, diag-
nosis and genetic selection in order to avoid serious and potentially
fatal (or seriously disabling) genetically determined diseases (where
there is a high risk of serious diseases) may sound ethically differently
from PGD for mutations in genes that merely increase the risk (with-
out a guarantee that the condition will develop later) of less severe
conditions or cause a carrier status for recessive disorders, or for
sex selection for indirect medical reasons (an application often con-
sidered ‘eugenic’) (de Wert et al., 2014; Altarescu et al., 2015).
There may be general agreement on the acceptability of the so-
called medical model of PGD (deWert, 2002; Steinbock, 2002),
when it focuses on and is restricted to the diagnosis of (future) health
problems, more precisely aberrations/mutations which (may) affect
the health of the prospective child, but it still remains ethically
troublesome (McMahan, 2005).
Worries about the possible negative effects of the use of PGD on
disabled people do exist on the grounds that it is discriminatory, has
pernicious effects on the lives of disabled people, and expresses a
hurtful view of disability (Parens and Asch, 2003; Malek, 2010). Some
claim that even preventing the birth of severely disabled children
using PGD is morally unacceptable (Petersen, 2005), predicting that
the use of PD technologies will lead to more injustice and greater dis-
crimination against people with disabilities, negatively affecting our
perception and care of children who are born disabled.
Concerns and worries about the consequences of PGD technolo-
gies may become even more exacerbated when applied for the selec-
tion of desirable non-medical traits unrelated to health, such as
intelligence, height, hair or eye colour, beauty or athletic genotypes
(so-called ‘designer babies’) or when applied for the possibility
offered, and obtainable by means of PGD, of conceiving healthy chil-
dren to save the life of another diseased child (El-Toukhy et al.,
2011). Even more debatable are the exceptional requests by couples
who themselves are affected by a genetic disease (deafness, dwarfism
by achondroplasia) to perform PGD and select embryos carrying the
same mutation for transfer to the uterus. The International Bioethics
Committee of UNESCO considers such an approach to be unethical
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because it does not take into account the many lifelong and irrevers-
ible disadvantages that will burden the future person.
Prenatal diagnosis
PD is one of the areas of medicine to receive a great deal of attention
in recent years, both in the scientific and bioethical fields (Strong,
2003; Chervenak and McCullough, 2011; Chadwick and Childs,
2012; Berceanu et al., 2014; de Jong et al., 2015; Dondorp and van
Lith, 2015). Interest has been fuelled by surprising and constant pro-
gress in the field and by inherent bioethical problems. Increasingly
accurate prenatal tests and investigations give parents powerful tools
for gleaning information about their unborn offspring (Brezina and
Kearns, 2014). However, scientific progress in this field undoubtedly
raises ethical challenges (Sijmons et al., 2011).
Before discussing the peculiar issue of wrongful life that derives
from PD development, it is necessary to try to define the bioethical
presuppositions that underlie PD in general.
The term PD refers to techniques that allow the diagnosis of sev-
eral diseases of the human embryo or foetus. Although PD potentially
allows targeted diagnostic testing for the planning of the delivery, the
counselling and education of the couples, and early postnatal interven-
tions for newborns with congenital malformations (Lakhoo, 2012), it
also often detects severe abnormalities where treatment is unavailable
or unlikely to be successful, and where the death of the foetus or neo-
nate is a likely outcome. One of the options available to mothers (and
couples) when a severe or lethal disease is detected is the termination
of the pregnancy (Menahem and Grimwade, 2003; Athanasiadis et al.,
2009; Kose et al., 2015; Maxwell et al., 2015; Domröse et al., 2016;
Gaille, 2016).
Thus, the central issue is related to the status of the human embryo
or foetus. The first problem is to define the human embryo or foetus. It
is beyond the scope of this article to provide a detailed discussion of
the bioethical and philosophical debate that has developed in our soci-
ety surrounding the actual beginning of human life, which has always
been viewed differently by various individuals, groups, cultures and reli-
gions (Dunstan, 1984; Shea, 1985; Beller and Zlatnik, 1992, 1995;
Drgonec, 1994; Shannon, 1997; Reuter, 2000; Kurjak and Tripalo,
2003; Schenker, 2008; Benagiano et al., 2011; Ventura-Juncá and
Santos, 2011). A question in the ongoing multidisciplinary debate is
whether the life of an embryo could be considered similar to that of a
human being. If so, from conception onwards, the same protection
allowed to every human is also due for the embryo. Other positions
consider that respect for the human life is conditioned by the level of its
development. Over the years, these different positions have animated a
lively debate on issues such as abortion. In recent years, the issue has
acquired a new dimension due to our growing capacity to make diagno-
ses at the beginning of life in ways that could not have been anticipated
some decades ago. As has been argued, these technologies have rede-
fined the scale, scope and the boundaries of medicine (Webster, 2002).
In this paradigm, the first step is to pay particular attention to the
‘therapeutic’ indications for PD. Questions arise, such as ‘is there a
treatment that is reasonably expected to benefit the patient?’, ‘are
there side adverse effects?’ and ‘are these negative effects tolerable in
the light of the expected benefits?’. Motives behind PD may vary
from the prevention, healing and/or alleviation of diseases to allowing
people (mother/parents) to make procreative informed decisions in
accordance with their own values and view of life. If only the former
motive is accepted, PD should only be carried out when the foetus
with the disease or abnormality could potentially benefit from the
available therapeutic measures. In recent years, advances in prenatal
screening and diagnosis mean that the majority of genetic diseases can
be detected early in gestation (Beaudet, 2015). Early diagnosis provides
the option of possible treatment. Surgical foetal interventions, and espe-
cially prenatal stem cell and gene therapy, have the potential to treat a
broad range of congenital disorders (Loukogeorgakis and Flake, 2014;
McClain and Flake, 2016). However, the clinical scenario varies from
foetal treatment with a reasonable chances of success, to experimental
foetal therapy with a low chance of success, thus raising profound eth-
ical issues (Dickens and Cook, 2003; Chervenak and McCullough,
2007; Noble and Rodeck, 2008; Dickens and Cook, 2011; Ville, 2011;
Chadwick and Childs, 2012; Munson, 1975; McMann et al., 2014).
When PD leads to prenatal treatment, which may involve invasive
procedures, this may put the pregnant woman’s health at risk.
Furthermore, complications such as premature birth cannot be over-
looked. This brings into question the appropriateness of carrying out
risky procedures for the uncertain possibility of benefit to the foetus and
the possible conflict between maternal and foetal health. In such circum-
stances, the pregnant woman is asked to make decisions about her own
medical care that unavoidably involves the health, prognosis and even
the possibility of survival of her unborn child. Women themselves might
find it difficult to decide for or against treatment. As a consequence,
underlying issues are at stake: the responsibility of healthcare providers
towards the mother and foetus and the duty to give appropriate infor-
mation and advice to pregnant women (Hunt et al., 2005). The pregnant
woman should be given all the information regarding the potential bene-
fit and risk to the foetus, and to her own health and fertility.
Summing up, the ethical debate surrounding PD, some conflicting
key points may be drawn.
For those for whom the human embryo should be considered a liv-
ing being from conception onwards, PD can be justified when the
option exists for therapeutic action on the foetus. The right of par-
ents to be informed of the health status of the foetus may be another
point to eventually be counterbalanced with the best interests of the
foetus. Parents have the right to be informed so as to be able to
adjust their expectations for their child in the face of the child’s med-
ical prognosis. Accurate information about their child and their child’s
condition may be a critical step in the adaptation process that accom-
panies the birth of a disabled or chronically ill newborn. However, in
such cases, there is also potential conflict between the autonomy of
the mother to accept or refuse these treatments and the rights and
interests of the foetus, as well as the question of the degree to which
the mother’s choices should be respected. Mothers are called on to
act as ‘moral agents’ in relation to choices for the foetus (Noble and
Rodeck, 2008). As a consequence, the mother also has the right to
refuse treatment, irrespective of foetal viability borders (Deprest
et al., 2011). In other words, if the status of person is assigned to the
foetus, both the interest of the foetus and the mother should be con-
sidered, and the beneficence-based obligation to the foetus must be
balanced with the beneficence-based and autonomy-based obliga-
tions to the mother.
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An alternative way of looking at the issue is to consider that the
aim of PD is to enable mothers and parents to make informed deci-
sions regarding the possibility or risk of having a child with a congeni-
tal disorder, with the alternative being termination of pregnancy.
Those who take the position that the human foetus before birth
does not deserve absolute protection, will justify PD even when
there is no therapy possible, and termination of pregnancy may be
the only alternative to giving birth to a child with a congenital disease.
Wrongful birth: the conceptual
paradigm
Advances in PD open the floodgates to allegations of liability for so-
called ‘wrongful birth’ or ‘wrongful life’ (Roth, 2007; Pioro et al.,
2008). For many years now, as the number of tests has expanded, so
too has the number of lawsuits alleging negligence against the medical
profession (Grady, 1992; Capen, 1995; Fisher and Witty, 2001).
Here we draw the distinguishing line between wrongful birth and
wrongful life (Table I). The term ‘wrongful birth’ refers to claims for
alleged negligence where an opportunity has been lost to parents to ter-
minate a pregnancy. These claims are often related to undetected foetal
abnormalities and involve a claim for damages by the parents of a child
for, most importantly, the costs of bringing up the child. Other types of
damages are non-pecuniary losses for both the mother and the father
for interference with family life (Brantley, 1976; Botkin, 1988; Botkin and
Mehlman, 1994; Whitney and Rosenbaum, 2011; Hassan et al., 2014).
The topic of wrongful birth bears witness to the increasing value of
information in doctor–patient relationships. This is supported by the
copious scholarly literature which has, over time, shaped the contents,
methods, times and sequences of information that should be given to
patients within this relationship (Turillazzi et al., 2014). A lack of infor-
mation has thus become a legal question which affords ample scope for
claims by patients unable to exercise their right to an informed accept-
ance (or indeed, refusal) of treatment (Akazaki, 1999).
The role of information may become particularly complex, as in
this case, when the decision of the patient (the mother) affects others
(the unborn or newborn child, father and siblings), including the phys-
ician whose conduct has conditioned such a decision. These are cases
where a lack of, or wrong, information regarding the malformation or
chromosomic anomalies of the foetus, has denied the pregnant
mother the right to exercise the ‘faculty’ of interrupting the preg-
nancy, thus resulting in the birth of an ‘unhealthy’ child (Frati et al.,
2014). For this reason, the professional relationship should be direc-
ted both towards checking for foetal malformations and (in the event
of a positive result) exercising the right to interrupt the pregnancy.
The conceptual paradigm, therefore, builds on the fact that the
woman has made it clear that she desires a ‘healthy child’ (at the risk
of interrupting the pregnancy) and therefore, the doctor’s role is to
suggest (and explain) all the possibilities for ‘safely’ determining the
conditions of the foetus (Dimopoulos and Bagaric, 2003). The doctor
is obliged, in such cases, to provide complete information regarding
(all) possible diagnostic tests, including their level of invasiveness and
risk, as well as the percentage of false negatives offered by the test cho-
sen. Further tests should be proposed (but certainly not carried out
routinely) as a possible alternative, outlining the risks they carry, so as
to allow the pregnant mother to decide what is best for her pregnancy.
Wrongful birth claims: looking
for the international roadmap
Wrongful birth claims are brought by the parents of a child born with
severe defects against a physician whose alleged negligence in the PD
deprived the parents of the opportunity to take an informed decision
about whether to avoid or terminate the pregnancy.
Over the years there have been different kinds of situations that
have been indented in this type of litigation: cases in which, due to
negligent conduct, a foetal anomaly that would have led the mother
to have an abortion was not diagnosed (Virginia Supreme Court;
Naccash v. Burger, 1982); cases where an abortion in a woman with
special risks was not achieved (Pennsylvania Supreme Court; Speck v.
Finegold, 1981); and cases of sterilization procedures not properly
handled by negligence (Court for the District of Columbia; Hartke v.
McKelway, 1981; Jha, 2016).
Historical references to the evolution of this particular kind of damage
are required in order to better understand the meaning of this particular
request for compensation and damages, as well as the difference with
the damage from ‘wrongful life’ and why in most cases the requests from
wrongful birth are accepted while those from wrongful life are rejected.
.............................................................................................................................................................................................
Table I Wrongful life versus wrongful birth actions.
Wrongful life Wrongful birth
Action Claim brought by or on behalf of a child. Claim brought by the parents.
Claims The child has suffered from birth defects because
the doctor is responsible for the undesired life.
The parents of a child born with birth defects, because of medical malpractice, were
deprived of the opportunity to decide whether to terminate the pregnancy.
Self-determination of the mother was undermined.
There was a lack of information or understanding by mother/parents regarding the
potential risks of having children with genetic or congenital anomalies, particularly in
light of developments in prenatal diagnosis.
Damages A life of pain and suffering of the child himself.
Costs for the maintenance of the disabled life.
Costs for the maintenance of the disabled child.
Impossibility of freely deciding their own family context.
Moral and psychological suffering.
References Kearl (1983), Kelly (1991), Jackson (1995), Gillon
(1998), Giesen (2012), Gur (2014).
Lenke and Nemes (1985), Jackson (1995), Sullivan (2000), Pioro et al. (2008), Hassan
et al. (2014), Hensel (2005).
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In the United States, in the 1970s, wrongful birth actions were
meant to be those actions made by the couple when an unintended
birth occurred; these claims were addressed to the manufacturers of
contraceptive methods, and against doctors who had administered inef-
fective drugs or had not carried out a proper sterilization. As a matter
of fact, in that period, the evolution of contraceptive techniques, such as
sterilization and birth control pills, began to allow birth control on the
part of couples, raising the need for a real ‘family planning’. The claims
for compensation were primarily targeted to reparation for the medical
expenses related to pregnancy and childbirth, the pain and suffering, as
well as the costs for the growth and education of the child (Court for
the Southern District of West Virginia; Whittington v. Eli Lilly, 1971).
With the development of non-therapeutic abortion laws and gen-
etic diagnosis, an evolution of case law concerning the ‘wrongful birth’
has arisen on the basis of the growing importance of the woman self-
determination principle, since she is the holder of the right to abor-
tion in the presence of foetal malformations. The evolution of genetic
diagnostics has allowed doctors to promptly recognize, even in early
pregnancy, the presence of certain foetal malformations and has inev-
itably resulted in an increase in legal actions related to the use of such
techniques, expanding the types of damage required. This obliged the
doctors to offer the proper genetic testing, to correctly interpret the
results and to inform parents promptly (DuBois, 2001; Carey, 2005).
Therefore, due to these developments in science and jurisprudence, also
the damage from ‘wrongful birth’ has evolved; as a matter of fact it is
invoked by parents following the birth of an unwanted child because of
his/her disability, in cases where the mother is deprived of the oppor-
tunity to decide whether to terminate the pregnancy (Moore, 1979).
The first wrongful birth claim presented at the Law Courts was in 1934,
in the State of Minnesota, United States. In the specific case, Christensen
v. Thornby, the Minnesota Supreme Court rejected the request of par-
ents, decreeing that the birth of a new child was a blessed event.
A few decades later, an important jurisprudential current had been
established. A first acknowledgement of wrongful birth damage was
implemented by the Court of Texas in 1975, in the case Jacobs v.
Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975). The case concerned a claim
made by the parents of a child born with defects as a result of the
contraction of rubella by the mother during the first month of preg-
nancy. Negligent conduct consisting of an incorrect diagnosis that had
prevented the parent from terminating the pregnancy was contested
to the clinicians. The Texas Supreme Court recognized, in this case,
the damage caused by compensating the costs involved in the care
and treatment of the child born with disabilities, but not the pain and
emotional distress suffered by parents. In support of the acceptance
of the compensation request, was the lack of information from physi-
cians because the treatment or negligent advice had deprived the par-
ents of the possibility to terminate the pregnancy.
The differences between the different types of damage that may
be required as a result of wrongful birth and wrongful life were well
established in 1996 by the Court of South Africa in the case of
Friedman v. Glicksman: the wrongful birth damage regards the
damages claimed by parents who would choose to terminate the
pregnancy if properly informed of foetal defects/malformations,
while the damage from wrongful life concerns the damages claimed
by the child on the grounds that the lack of information about the
malformation prevented parents from terminating the pregnancy,
causing the birth of a child with disabilities, resulting in pain and
suffering for the life of a ‘born malformed’ (Court of South Africa;
Friedman v. Glicksman, 1996).
Nowadays, courts around the word generally allow wrongful birth
actions.
In USA, the majority of States allow actions of wrongful birth:
Alabama, Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware,
Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island,
Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wyoming
(Maryland Court of Special Appeals, 2001). The words of the
Supreme Court of New Hampshire sum up the case law of the
American States that recognize the wrongful birth actions: ‘a wrongful
birth claim is unlike any other medical malpractice action because it
involves the uniquely personal choice to terminate a pregnancy or
give birth to a child with the increased possibility of severe birth
defects. In this respect, a fact finder should also consider the plaintiff’s
emotional and physical ability to digest and act upon the information
concerning the increased possibility of birth defects within the time
period at issue, as well as her willingness and ability to travel to
another jurisdiction to obtain an abortion during her third trimester,
had she been able to arrange one (Supreme Court of New
Hampshire; Hall v. Dartmouth Hitchcock Medical Center, 2006). In a
more recent judgement of 2011, the Court of Illinois (Court of
Illinois; Clark v. Children’s Memorial Hospital, 2011) affirmed these
principles and, furthermore, the compensable damage was recog-
nized not only for the cost of the care of the disabled child (up to the
18th birthday) but also for the moral suffering (Hurley and McKenna,
2013). In a minority of states, however, the damage from wrongful
birth is not recognized; in Liddington v. Burns (U.S. District Court for
the Western District of Oklahoma, 1995), the Court of Oklahoma
rejected the claim for two reasons: the first reason concerned the
ultrasound test, as the result was not recognized as eligible to justify
an abortion, and secondly, the Court rejected the request arguing
that there was no indisputable evidence that the mother would have
wanted and would have had an abortion in the first trimester of preg-
nancy. Furthermore, in some states, there is a specific article in the
statues specifying that wrongful birth and/or wrongful life claims are
banned: Kansas (K.S.A. 60-1906, 2013), South Dakota (SDCL 21-55-2,
1987), Oklahoma (63 Okl.St.Ann. 1-741.12, 2010), Missouri (V.A.M.S.
188.130, 1986), Michigan (M.C.L.A. 600.2971, 2011), Minnesota (M.S.A.
145.424, 2005), Maine (24 M.R.S.A. 2931,1990), Idaho (I.C. 5-334, 2010)
and Arizona (A.R.S. 12-719, 2012) (Eagan, 2006; Pergament and Ilijic,
2014).
The Supreme Court of Canada, in Arndt v. Smith (2 S.C.R. 539,
1997) recognized ‘wrongful birth’ damage, justifying the decision with
an interference with the right to choose an abortion. In this case,
Carol Arndt sued her physician for not informing her of the risks
associated with the contraction of chickenpox during pregnancy.
During the dispute, the mother argued that, if properly informed
about the risk of harm to the foetus, she would have terminated the
pregnancy; on the other hand, the doctor contested that the patient
would have still carried the pregnancy to term and that therefore he
could not be attributed any responsibility (Rinaldi, 2009).
In the United Kingdom, in the 2000s, courts recognized substantial
amounts including the expenses for the growth of a child born mal-
formed, for loss of earnings and for the school. The leading case for
such claims was the case of Parkinson v. St James e Seacroft Hospital
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NHS Trust (QB 266, 2002). On this occasion, the Court ordered the
payment of damages caused by the birth of a disabled child due to a
sterilization. A similar decision was adopted in the case of Rand v.
East Dorset Health Authority (2000) Lloyd’s Rep Med, in which the
parents were not informed about the result of a test that showed
that the mother was likely to give birth to a baby suffering from
Down syndrome. The court held that the parents were entitled to
claim compensation for damages related to the child support costs
since they had not been able to exercise their right to terminate the
pregnancy (Hassan et al., 2014). In 2002, in Rees v. Darlington
Memorial Hospital NHS Trust Ltd., the Court of Appeal ruled that
the birth of a healthy but unplanned child brings additional costs;
moreover, the judge stated that the mother has the right to claim
compensation for damage caused by a birth due to a negligent con-
duct of the doctor (London Royal Courts of Justice; Rees v.
Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS Trust, 2003).
In Australia, the case law is very similar to that in the United
Kingdom, as demonstrated by the case Cattanach v. Melchior, dis-
cussed by the High Court in 2003. In particular, most of the appeals
have been received with recognition of the damage resulting from
the loss of earnings and expenses for the maintenance of the child
(Thomas, 2002). Moreover, in the case of Veivers v. Connolly 2 Qd
R 326 on 1995, the Supreme Court of Queensland ruled in favour of
a mother who had given birth to a child with severe disabilities due
to negligent conduct of the doctor who failed to diagnose the
mother with rubella and to inform her about the consequent risks
for the foetus (Petersen, 1997).
In Ireland, the Constitutional right to life has a weighty impact on
the effect of wrongful birth and life cases, as this right is extensively
protected by the judiciary. In this regard, the most recent case law
perceives the unborn child, whether healthy or disabled, as a blessing,
resulting in rejection of the claims for compensation for damage
caused by wrongful conception or wrongful birth cases (Alvarez,
2000). The fact that the child is a blessing and that he/she is very
much wanted by the society in Ireland is evident within the provisions
of the Constitution of Ireland 1937 as amended. In fact, the article
40.3.3 declares that ‘The State acknowledges the right to life of the
unborn and, with due regard to the equal right to life of the mother,
guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws
to defend and vindicate that right.’ (Daly, 2005).
In the Netherlands, wrongful birth claims have been approved for
many years; in 1997, with the particular so-called Missing IUD case,
the Dutch Supreme Court (the Hoge Raad) recognized the compen-
sation of the costs for the growth of the child as well as for non-
economic damages in favour of the mother. Moreover, in a more
recent judgement of 26 March 2003, the Court extensively clarified
that this type of damage is to be recognized to parents. In this case, a
foetal abnormality was not promptly recognized and the child was
born with multiple malformations, both mental and physical. This
negligence of the doctor resulted in violating the legal right of the
mother to opt for an abortion. Therefore, damages against the hos-
pital, amounting to the baby care costs, were also awarded to the
parents (Nys and Dute, 2004).
In Germany, the German Supreme Court allowed wrongful birth
claims in 1980 with two cases: the 76 BGHZ 249 and the 76 BGHZ
259; moreover, in the judgement of Bundesgerichtshof on 1983 the
‘wrongful birth’ claim was allowed because a disabled child was born
as a consequence of a wrong diagnosis by the doctor; the compensa-
tion was recognized on the grounds of a negligent non-performance
of contract (Dutch Federal Court of Justice, 1983; Carmi and Wax,
2002; Shaw, 1990). In recent years, the situation was rather difficult
when it came to maintenance loss (non-pecuniary losses are awarded
for the mother). This issue is still a matter of extensive debate; in
fact, the German Federal Court of Justice is in favour of allowing a
wrongful birth claim, awarding the costs of raising the child under cer-
tain conditions, but the Second Chamber of the constitutional court,
the Federal Constitutional Court, is against this, considering these
damages to be contrary to the dignity of the child. The Federal Court
of Justice has remained true to its opinion, however, and these costs
are generally compensated (van Gerven et al., 2001; Giesen, 2008).
The Austrian Supreme Court on 12 July 1990 (Juristische Blatter,
1991) applied the theory of informed consent and wrongful birth. In
the decision at issue, the judges came to the conclusion that a physician
does not need to inform about every single risk of medical therapy.
With regard to wrongful birth, the court rejected the maintenance
costs which were caused by a physician’s negligent conduct because
the doctor is not responsible for an unwanted pregnancy on the basis
of informed consent (Bernat, 1992).
In Italy, the debate on the recognition of wrongful birth and wrong-
ful life damages has been going for years. With the judgement no.
25767 on 22 December 2015, the Highest Italian Court provided a
clear jurisprudence recognizing wrongful birth claims and rejecting
wrongful life ones. The Court found that the inability of the woman
to choose to terminate the pregnancy because of the negligence of
the doctor, who had not properly informed her, is a source of civil
liability; the request for damages made by the parents should, there-
fore, be accepted.
In Spain, wrongful birth claims are allowed but only if they are
brought by the mother. The Supreme Court was clear on this matter,
ruling that the right to opt for abortion constitutes a personal, non-
transferable, right of the mother, which becomes an obstacle to a
claim made exclusively by the father. The sentence of the Supreme
Court of the 5 December 2007 had clarified the reasons stating that
the abortion is a practice exclusively inherent to women. Concluding,
solely the mother is entitled to claim compensation for wrongful birth
damage, being the only holder of the right to abortion (Arantzazu
Vicandi Martínez, 2013).
In Belgium, the Brussels Court of Appeal ruled that parents may
sue physicians who fail to diagnose serious foetal malformations,
assuming that parents, if properly informed, would proceed to the
interruption of pregnancy. In particular, with the statement of the
21 September 2010, the Brussels Court of Appeal dealt with the
case of a Muslim woman who complained that the hospital did not
warn her of the serious illness affecting her foetus. The hospital justi-
fied the information defect arguing that the disease was found after
the deadline prescribed by Islam for abortion. The Court, accepting
the claim, concluded that the compensation must be accorded
because the lack of information determined the birth of a child with
disabilities (Court of Appeal of Brussels, 2010).
In France, the 4 March 2002 law stated that nobody can claim a
damage resulting from the mere fact of being born, which leaves
open a wide range of interpretations. In principle, a claim for child
maintenance costs is deemed possible in cases of birth of a mal-
formed child (in this occurrence, the non-pecuniary damage is also
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recognized) or in cases where the mother is in poor financial condi-
tion or develops mental problems after the baby is born. The birth of
a healthy child is not considered a sufficient ground to justify the claim
for damages (Viney and Jourdain, 2006).
In May 2011, the European Court of Human Rights ruled on wrongful
birth. In the case R. R. v. Poland, a woman claimed that her access to
prenatal genetic testing had been denied with the subsequent birth of a
child suffering from Turner syndrome. The Court highlighted a violation
regarding the prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment and a vio-
lation of the right to respect for private and family life, thereby deciding
in favour of the mother. In the judgement, it was also noted that the fail-
ure of the prenatal genetic test had violated the woman’s right to
health-related information and the right to personal autonomy.
In Japan, the claims for damages due to wrongful birth are generally
accepted. The legal basis of this approach lies in the violation of the
doctor’s duty to give advice about the probability of the birth of a
child with disabilities. In fact, the Japanese system does not provide
foetal indications for abortion (Sakaihara, 2002).
In New Zealand, on the basis of the current legislation, there is no
legal ability for either the parents or the child to obtain compensation
for negligent prenatal genetic testing, even though the debate is still
open. In this regard, the New Zealand Supreme Court recently ruled
on the case Allenby v. H., considering that the law provides a cover-
age for pregnancies arising from medical misadventures (Tobin, 2005;
Gordon, 2012; Cleary, 2013).
South African law recognizes claims for wrongful pregnancy and
wrongful birth. The first case involving wrongful birth in a South
African court was in 1996, in the matter of Friedman v. Glicksman; on
that occasion, the mother of a child born with disabilities had accused
the doctor because, if properly informed, she would have terminated
the pregnancy. In its decision, the court upheld the appeal due to a
breach of the contractual duty of the physician to properly inform the
mother about the congenital deficits of her child (Strauss, 1996).
In Israel, actions for wrongful birth are allowed: in a recent sen-
tence, on May 2012, Israeli Supreme Court declared that while
wrongful birth claims were still permitted, wrongful life claims were
no longer accepted in a court of law. Thus, the parents are entitled
to compensation for the additional expenses required to fulfil their
child’s medical needs and support the child. In cases where the child
continues to depend on the parents beyond childhood because of
his/her disability, compensation is provided for the expenses resulting
from the child’s maintenance for the duration of his life (Mor, 2014).
In other countries, such as in Estonia, there is no a specific legisla-
tion and the debate is still open (Sõritsa and Lahe, 2014).
In the Czech Republic, the Brno Regional Court (judgement file
No. 24 Co 66/2001) ordered an hospital to compensate the non-
pecuniary damage suffered by a mother who had given birth to a
healthy baby, despite her manifest desire to have an abortion.
Emphasizing the right of the mother to decide about her unborn
child, the High Court in Olomouc upheld the Regional Court decision
in its decision on No. 1 Co 192/2008.
In Chile, a ‘wrongful birth’ claim is not admissible because in
Chilean legislation abortions are always forbidden by law.
This review of the international case law shows that the majority
of states recognize the wrongful birth claims.
In fact, in case of negligent conduct consisting on the breach of the
doctor’s duty to provide information about the presence of foetal
malformations, the courts recognize the liability for violation of the
right to self-determination of women, according to the principles of
modern medical practice.
The foreclosure of the opportunity to make an informed choice
about the interruption of pregnancy, resulting from the lack of infor-
mation about the risk of giving birth to a child with disabilities, makes
the physician responsible for damages resulting from an unwanted
birth which is therefore deserving of a compensation claim.
Wrongful life
Claims of ‘wrongful life’ are made on behalf of the disabled child by
his/her representatives, i.e. most notably the parents (Schmidt, 1983;
Tucker, 1988–1989; Bottis, 2004). These claims, for having to live a
life full of suffering because of a disability, are brought against a doc-
tor or obstetrician. In these cases, the claim is that, overall, living is
considered to bring more harm than good.
Although wrongful life is a highly debated topic (Liu, 1987; Sharman,
2001; Perry, 2007; DeGrazia, 2015; Francis, 2015), wrongful life claims
have been brought against medical practitioners in many developed
countries. Wrongful life cases are usually controversial and verdicts
may differ between countries based on differences in the various legal
jurisdictions (Giesen, 2012).
Wrongful life claims: an
international overview
The term ‘wrongful life’ was first used in a case of illegitimate
birth in the United States (Supreme Court of Illinois; Zepeda v.
Zepeda, 1963).
The child claimed damages from his father for being an illegitimate
child and suffering all the consequent hardships. The Illinois Supreme
Court dismissed the case, focusing on the fact that the acceptance of
a wrongful life claim would have legal and social implications and
might encourage people to seek damages for any conditions they
considered disadvantageous (Evgenia, 2012).
Nowadays, courts around the world are generally reluctant to
acknowledge such claims due to their ethical and legal implications.
In the Netherlands, the Supreme Court recognized a wrongful life
claim in the Kelly Molenaar case in March 2005. The Court granted living
costs to a child born with a congenital malformation, i.e. for her upbring-
ing, greater costs related to her disability and non-pecuniary losses for
harmful individual experiences. Although it was affirmed that a life with a
disability has no less value than a healthy life, it was acknowledged that
the child’s life would be more difficult (Nys and Dute, 2004; Sheldon,
2003, 2005). The Dutch legislators have not subsequently intervened on
the matter, not even when asked specifically to consider doing so, affirm-
ing that the decision of the Supreme Court was in accordance with the
rules of private law in the Netherlands and that there was no apparent
reason for the legislator to decide otherwise on this issue (Giesen, 2012).
In Spain, wrongful life actions were first excluded and then indirectly
allowed. The first time dates back to 1997 when the Supreme Court
rejected a request, affirming that it was in clear contrast with the right
to life and human dignity. Later, on 4 February 1998, 6 July 2007 and
4 November 2008, the Supreme Court confirmed its prior judgement,
affirming that the birth of a diseased person is not an evil and that the
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birth of a child cannot be considered a damage. More recently, on
16 June 2010 and even prior to this, on 18 December 2003, the
Supreme Court indirectly allowed wrongful life actions. Although it was
denied that the birth of a child could be considered a damage, a baby
born with a disability was awarded a lifelong monthly pension, inspired
by social welfare principles (de Angel Yágüez, 2005).
In Germany, wrongful life actions are denied. The principal case
concerns a child whose mother contracted rubella during pregnancy
(BGH Bundesgerichtshof, 18 January 1983). The mother had not
been informed about the risks of giving birth to a disabled child and,
as legal guardian, she brought wrongful birth and wrongful life pro-
ceedings to ask for compensation on the child’s behalf. The German
judges recognized the validity of the mother’s action while rejecting
the wrongful life case, on the grounds that doctors do not have the
obligation to impede the birth of a baby with congenital malforma-
tions, as to do so would be to undermine the value of human life
itself (Giesen, 1988; Markesinis and Unberath, 2002).
Austria excludes wrongful life actions. The principal case is the
Supreme Court’s decision on 25 May 1999. According to the judge,
the obligation of abortion in the event of a diagnosis of malformation
does not exist in the Austrian judicial system; therefore, there was no
causal relationship between the omitted diagnosis and the birth. The
Austrian judges have considered unquantifiable the wrongful life dam-
age and inadmissible the possibility for the child born with disabilities to
bring proceedings even against his or her parents (Bernat, 1992).
In the United Kingdom, wrongful life claims are not recognized.
Although the 1976 Congenital Disabilities Act allows the child to sue
the doctor whose conduct was responsible for his or her disability,
this possibility does not exist in the case of omitted information. In
the famous 1982 McKay v. Essex Area Health Authority case, the legit-
imacy of wrongful life actions was categorically excluded (Queen’s
Bench, 1982). This is a landmark case for other common law courts. An
erroneous diagnosis had led to the birth of a baby suffering from a
severe disability, because of rubella contracted during the gestation peri-
od. The judges rejected the parents’ claim. There was conflict with the
principle of the sanctity of human life, according to which all human life is
of value and it is therefore inconceivable that the life of a disabled person
is considered of lesser value than a healthy one. For the English judges, it
was important to prevent the further risk of children born with disabil-
ities bringing proceedings even against their own parents and pushing
doctors towards defensive medicine, such as suggesting abortion in the
case of foetal malformation diagnosis. In general, for the doctor, the
duty of abortion does not exist; therefore there is no causal relationship
between omission and birth. Such disability is congenital and cannot be
attributed in any way to medical conduct (Jackson, 1996; Gur, 2014).
In France, wrongful life actions are not allowed but the debate on the
topic became very interesting around 2000. In 1994, magistrates faced
this issue for the first time with the Quarez case. The judges denied
compensation to a child born with a disability because the maintenance
costs were absorbed by the proceeding brought by his parents. The
principal French case is the Perruche case (Cour de Cassation de
France, 2000), in which a boy was born with a severe disability because
of rubella contracted during pregnancy. In this case, the Supreme Court
admitted the wrongful life action, recognizing the causal connection
between the doctor’s omission and the undesired birth (Dorozynski,
2001). This sentence provoked strong reaction from the public who
judged that the decision infringed the right to life and human dignity.
Despite this, a few months later, the Supreme Court pronounced up to
five judgements between 13 July and 28 November 2001. Law no. 303
of 4 March 2002 embraced public opinion and excluded wrongful life
actions, unless the disability was caused by medical conduct. The political
choice was clear, i.e. to avoid qualifying life as compensable and passing
on this charge to the medical profession. The French case is even more
interesting because the legislator deemed the law to be retroactive, thus
provoking the intervention of the European Court of Human Rights.
Although the European Court recognized the legitimacy of the content
of the legislation, it condemned the fact that it was retroactive (Loi
Kouchner 2002; ECHR, Vo v. France, 2004; Clement and Rodat, 2006;
Manaouil et al., 2012; Manaouil and Jardè, 2012).
A bill similar to the French one was proposed in Belgium in January
2002 but never became law. The court of first instance of Brussels
has twice allowed a wrongful life claim under Belgian general tort law,
citing the French Perruche case, and the Brussels’ Court of Appeal has
recently (Court of Appeal of Brussels, 2010) also allowed a claim.
The defendant has lodged an appeal at the Belgian Supreme Court.
Currently in Belgium, wrongful life is still neither regulated nor clear
(Giesen, 2012; Devisch, 2013).
In Italy, the position of judges in this regard were not entirely
clear until a recent judgement of the Highest Court that seems to
have finally closed the issue. Some judges used to recognize the
right to compensation only for parents, while, recently, other judges
have extended this right also to the child with congenital malforma-
tions. These disagreements led the Highest Italian Court to convene
in a unifying resolution and to pronounce a judgement (no. 25767/
22 December 2015) to be followed by all others Italian courts.
Therefore, the right to compensation for wrongful life claims has
definitely been excluded.
Also in Hungary, after an earlier acceptance of wrongful life claims,
the Supreme Court (Unificatory Decision of no. 1/2008, 12 March
2008) established that wrongful life claims cannot be accepted under
Hungarian law (Winiger et al., 2011). Greece, Poland and Portugal
are also rejecting this kind of claim (Giesen, 2012). There is no case
law for wrongful conception, wrongful birth and wrongful life in
Estonia (Sõritsa and Lahe, 2014).
The state of Israel recognized wrongful life actions for more than
twenty years. This changed in 2012 with the Hammer decision, inter-
rupting a jurisprudential line that went as far back as 1986 with the
Zeitsov v. Katz case (Levi, 1987; Carmi, 1990). For the judges, the
acknowledgement of the right to compensation aimed to improve
the quality of a life that had begun with an inferior condition and was
characterized by pain, since there were few socio-economic struc-
tures to help and assist disabled people. In May 2012, with the
Hammer v. Amit case, the Israeli Supreme Court banned these
actions, thereby refusing recognition of the right not to be born if not
in good health (Israeli Supreme Court, 2012; Mor, 2014).
Canadian (Toews and Caulfield, 2014) and most American courts
also deny this cause of action. The American States that allow wrongful
life actions are the State of California with the Curlender v. Bioscience
Laboratories case and the Turpin v. Sortini case, the State of
Washington with the Haberson v. Parke-Davis case and the State of
New Jersey with the Prokanic v. Cillo case (VanDerhoef, 1983). The
Californian case is perhaps the most interesting one because it over-
turns a previous line that had excluded the legitimacy of such actions.
The judges of Curlender v. Bioscience Laboratories case, rejecting the
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explanatory statements regarding the sanctity of life and the impossibil-
ity of measuring the difference between a life with deficiencies and the
emptiness of non-existing adopted up to that moment, allowed wrongful
life actions and the fact that a disabled person’s life could be compensable.
After 2 years, in 1982, with the Turpin v. Sortini case, the Californian
judges allowed such actions, specifying, however, that they could be made
only against doctors and not against parents, as this would restrict the lat-
ter’s freedom of choice in the procreative domain. However, in contrast
to the Curlender v. Bioscience Laboratories case, the judges restricted the
compensation just to the major costs connected to disability. The other
states are essentially in agreement with the Californian judges’ position
(Laufer, 1982; Steinbock, 1986; Klein and Mahoney, 2007).
Although in Japan a child who is born disabled is able to file a claim
against the person who injured him or her in the mother’s womb
(Sakaihara, 2007) and cases of wrongful birth claims have been
awarded (Sakaihara, 2002), to the best of our knowledge no wrongful
life lawsuits against medical practitioners have been filed in Japan.
In Australia, claims regarding both wrongful life and wrongful birth
cases have been brought to the attention of the courts. In 2003 a High
Court decision stated that damages may not only be awarded for pain
and suffering and any loss of income due to the pregnancy and birth, but
also for the costs of raising the child to 18 years of age. Following this
decision, legislation was introduced in New South Wales, Queensland
and South Australia preventing an award of damages for the costs of
raising a child in ‘wrongful birth’ claims. In 2006 a decision of the High
Court (High Court of Australia, 2006; New South Wales Court of
Appeal, 2015) regarding a wrongful life claim established that disabled
children are unable to sue medical practitioners for wrongful life, but the
parents of disabled children are still able to pursue a claim in their own
right for wrongful birth in the case of medical negligence (Devereux,
2002; Connors, 2005; Bird, 2006; Faunce and Jefferys, 2007).
Along the same lines are judgments of claims in Korea (Um, 2000)
and in Singapore (Giesen, 2012).
Finally, the South African Supreme Court of Appeal, while assessing
that healthcare practitioners who failed to detect and inform parents of
congenital anomalies in the foetus so that they could have considered
termination of pregnancy were liable to pay damages for wrongful birth,
denied the wrongful life claim from the same child (South Africa Supreme
Court of Appeal, 2008). The Court held that the law cannot adjudicate
on the questions of existentialism, ‘which would require a court to deter-
mine whether a child should have been born, since this goes to the heart
of what it is to be human’ (Chima and Mamdoo, 2015).
In conclusion, a glance at the international scenarios highlights the fact
that the courts have overwhelmingly rejected wrongful life actions while
at the same time approving those for wrongful birth (Tables II and III).
Critical issues arising from
wrongful life claims
Analysis of the different jurisdictional solutions shows that wrongful life
claims are generally rejected for several reasons. These include ethical
and social concerns in admitting that non-existence is better than being
born with a disability, and the difficulty in calculating damages for having
been born with a disability as opposed to not having been born at all
(Jones and Perry, 1983; Young, 2004; Kapteiran, 2006).
Wrongful life and wrongful birth issues lie at the intersection of law
and ethics. From an ethical point of view, wrongful life claims seem to
involve weighing the value of non-existence against life with a disabil-
ity. Wrongful life is controversial because it appears to identify the
impaired child’s life as an injury, a concept contrary to many deeply
held beliefs in society. The traditional reason given when rejecting
wrongful life actions is the fact that life is never an injury. The courts
generally refuse to recognize this kind of claim because of the pre-
sumption that life in any condition is preferable to non-existence, and
therefore can never be an injury; as a matter of fact, the majority of
countries have rejected wrongful life actions while at the same time
approving those for wrongful birth (Fig. 1).
Because alleged medical negligence does not actually cause the
child’s impairment, but instead enables the child to come into being,
.............................................................................................................................................................................................
Table II International state of law: wrongful Life allowed or not clear.
States Cases Solutions
Netherland Kelly Molenaar, 2005 Child would live a life with greater difficulties.
Costs of maintenance of the disabled life.
USA:
(1) State of California (1) Curlender v. Bio Lab; Turpin v. Sortini A disabled person’s life could be compensable.
(2) State of Washington (2) Heberson v. Parke-Davis In Turpin case, compensation was just for the major costs connected
to disability.(3) State of New Jersey (3) Prokanic v. Cillo
Belgium Cour d’Appel Bruxelles, 21 Sept 2010, but the
case is still in progress→ The position of Belgium
is actually not clear.
There is a causal relationship between the doctor’s omissive practice
and the undesired birth.
Spain Tribunal Supremo, Jun 2010, rec. 448/2008 Child would live a life with disability due to unwanted birth. The tools
to limit the pain, suffering and distress were provided by a
requirement to pay a monthly pension for life. →Wronguful Life
action indirectly allowed.
Japan No cases found The position of Japan is not clear but a child who is born disabled is
able to file a claim against the person who injured him or her in the
mother’s womb; cases of wrongful birth claims have been awarded.
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the operable injury is the child’s life itself, with non-existence identi-
fied as the preferred alternative.
Thus, the life-as-injury seems to be the Gordian knot of the
robust ethical debate surrounding the issue of wrongful life claims,
which is characterized by strong emotive labelling. There are ‘situa-
tions in which the burdens of life outweigh its benefits, thereby
enabling life to be termed ‘wrongful’ in life’ (Jackson, 1996). Damage
to the child should, then, be measured not as part of the life versus
non-life dilemma, nor regarding a hypothesized ‘non-value of a dis-
abled life’ but, rather, in terms of the functional level of infirmity and
the developmental possibilities of a life with disabilities. What it
amounts to is not simply an algebraic sum of life plus disability but, in
essence, a disabled life.
There should be no distinction, therefore, between the sacredness
of life and quality of life. Instead, regardless of subjective perceptions
of quality of life, emphasis should be placed on health, understood as
being ‘not only within the static dimensions of absence of illness but
as a dynamic/functional condition of mental-physical wellbeing’.
The ‘tragedy’ of a particularly severe disability which is a constitu-
tive part of the child’s biography and will be so for life, yet which
does not diminish the child’s dignity as a human being, justifies taking
the greatest care both of the child and of all the other subjects (family
members) involved.
The philosophical literature is rich in strong emotional references:
‘empty of all the things that make life worth living’ (Steinbock, 2009),
‘dominated by pain and suffering’ (Bennett, 2009), ‘intractably
miserable’ (Rakowski, 2002), ‘not worth living’ (Feinberg, 1986) or
‘worse than no life at all’ (Brock, 1995). Contrasting views on this
issue address the core of the question in different ways: whether chil-
dren have the right to pursue damages for having been born and to
claim that they would have been better off aborted or not conceived.
Those who reject wrongful life suits claim that one cannot be harmed
by being conceived, born or being brought to life (Kennedy, 1983;
Feinberg, 1984; Parfit, 1984; Roberts, 2003), mostly basing their argu-
ments on the fact that if one was not conceived, then one would never
have existed at all (Parfit, 1984). In this respect Feinberg’s words are
illuminating: "To be harmed is to be put in a worse condition than one
would otherwise be in (to be made ‘worse off’), but if the negligent act
had not occurred, B would not have existed at all. The creation of an
initial condition is not the worsening of a prior condition; therefore, it is
not an act of harming, no matter how harmful it is” (Feinberg, 1984).
Moreover, those who disallow the feasibility of wrongful life suits fear
that the endorsement of the above claim is tantamount to an affirm-
ation that non-life is preferable to a life afflicted with disease and that
a perilous ‘slippery slope’ could be triggered by wrongful life claims.
Shapira, while supporting the thesis that it would be both feasible and
desirable to endorse wrongful life compensation actions, says: "And
what if a child seeks compensation for ‘wrongful life’ not from a gen-
etic counsellor but from his or her parents, claiming that were it not
for their parental imprudence, he or she would not have been born
into a life burdened by any number of disadvantages—genetic illness
or HIV infection, the stigma of illegitimacy, religious persecution or
.............................................................................................................................................................................................
Table III International state of law: wrongful life denied
States Cases Solutions
Italy Italian Supreme Court, Joined Chambers,
no. 25767 of 22 December 2015
It is not possible that the doctor, responsible for not giving the mother a full information,
has to compensate also the child.
The disabled child’s life cannot be considered a damage, assuming it has less value than
the life of a healthy child.
There is no damage.
France Law no. 303 of 4 March 2002 Wrongful Life actions are definitely excluded unless it has been the medical conduct itself
causing the malformation.
Human life is not a compensable damage.
It is not possible to ascribe to the society the maintenance costs of children born with
disabilities.
Germany BGH 18 Jan 1983 The doctors do not have the obligation to prevent the birth of a malformed child.
Austria OGH 25 May 1999 Absence of causal relationship between the omiited diagnosis and the birth.
Hungary Supreme Court, Unificatory Resolution,
no. 1/2008
The rights protected by Law (e.g. life, human dignity, economic interests) are not
infringed by the fact of being born.
Life could not constitute damage.
United Kingdom McKay v. Essex Area Health Authority, 1982 Human life has value in any case: principle of the sanctity of human life.
A disabled person’s life is not considered of a lesser value than a healthy person’s life.
Australia Harriton v. Stephen and Waller v. Jans, 2006 It is impossibile to calculate damages.
A disabled person’s life should not be devalued.
There is an absence of causal relationship between medical pracitise and birth of a
disabled child.
South Africa Friedman v. Glicksman, 1996 and Stewart v.
Botha, 2007
The law cannot adjudicate on the questions of existentialism.
Israel Hamer v. Amit, May 2012 The right ‘not to be born’ if not in good health is not recognized.
Wrongful life claims send a negative message about a life with a disability.
Canada Bovington v. Hergott, 2008 A child cannot claim to have suffered harm as a result of their birth.
It is better to be alive than never been born.
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ethnic prejudice, racial discrimination or socio-economic deprivation?”
(Shapira, 1998).
Finally, it has also been argued that torts like wrongful life may
reinforce a negative image of disability in society, since juries in such
actions are required to evaluate whether a disability is so terrible as to
make plausible the mother’s decision to abort, or the non-existence of
the disabled child. The centrality of impairment in defining personhood
could be reinforced by wrongful life torts, thus strengthening discrimin-
atory beliefs regarding disabled persons (Hensel, 2005). In other words,
at the individual level, the beneficial effects of recognizing a monetary
compensation in wrongful life claims are clearly undeniable. However,
the use of the judiciary tool (via wrongful life actions) to obtain the
necessary assistance seems to some legal scholars to reflect ‘the ben-
evolent paternalism embedded in the medical model of disability, in
which the nondisabled ‘assume the role of protectors, guides and
spokespersons for disabled citizens’ without ever challenging the ‘attitu-
dinal discrimination’ in society’ (Harlan, 1994; Hensel, 2005).
On the other hand, supporters of the legitimacy of wrongful life
claims argue against the supposed illogicalness and incoherence of
these actions, focusing on the fact that it is not a necessary and a suf-
ficient condition that one is worse off than his/her prior condition in
order to assign harm to his/her current condition (Muriithi, 2011),
and that a comparison has to be made between the actual impaired
life of a plaintiff and the hypothetical unimpaired life rather than
between defective life and non-existence (Shapira, 1998; Dimopoulos
and Bagaric, 2003; Morris and Saintier, 2003).
In the final analysis, contrasting views on the issue of wrongful life
claims are difficult to reconcile; on one hand there are those who
view wrongful life actions as a threat with a very disturbing message,
i.e. non-existence is never preferable to life, however, burdened. On
the other hand, the conceptual position favourable to wrongful life
claims is based on the assertion that being conceived, born or being
brought to existence can be harmful, without entering into an emo-
tional comparison between existence and non-existence.
The decision that a particular life is not worth living is a very diffi-
cult one as the notion that life, however, impaired, is always prefer-
able to non-existence would be challenged as unsound. Some
American Courts have expressed the concept that human experi-
ence does not make possible the life–non-existence comparison
necessitated by the wrongful life action (Supreme Court of New
Jersey, Berman v. Allan, 1979; Supreme Court of California, Turpin v.
Sortini, 1982). On these grounds, one of the main criticisms of
wrongful life action takes on a ‘grass is always greener’ approach. The
child has never experienced a healthy life, and, when born, will have
life experiences relative to her disability. Accordingly, the child suffers
nothing since all that she/he knows is her/his actual condition with
its concomitant pain and suffering (Belsky, 1993). Thus the phrase
‘wrongful life’ seems to be counterintuitive since a comparison
between a situation where an individual exists and a situation in
where that individual does not exist, made for the purpose of estab-
lishing whether the individual is better or worse off in either situation
is thought to be impossible (Stretton, 2006). However, it may be
argued that it is not entirely impossible to compare existence with
non-existence. Echoing Stretton (Stretton, 2006), ‘one cannot, for
example, imagine what it is like to be unconscious: there is nothing
unconsciousness is like, no (conscious) experience to be imagined.
Yet one can compare unconsciousness with consciousness and say,
for example, that it is better to be awake and having pleasant,
Figure 1 Overview of the countries that accept or reject wrongful life actions.
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conscious experiences, than to be comatosed. Indeed, that very
comparison leads to the award of damages for loss of enjoyment of
life’. Furthermore, it may be argued that sometimes non-existence is
preferable to certain kinds of life (Stretton, 2005, 2006). To express
this more clearly, ‘normally’ a great part of us are glad to exist and
think that life is better than non-existence. This is not because non-
existence is bad, but because non-existence is nothingness, and
therefore has zero value, whereas life is for the most part good, and
therefore has greater than zero value (Nagel, 1986). As a conse-
quence, most of us would prefer to continue living than to die or be
killed. However, the ethical reflection on the issue leads to a subse-
quent question: how bad would life have to be to be worse than
non-existence? Are there some disabilities so severe that they make
life not worth living? Does a minimally bearable quality of life exist?
Examples drawn from jurisprudential US cases may help us to under-
stand. In Harriton (2006) 226 ALR 391, 415, Kirby J tried to explain
‘Consider the situation of a newborn child who has a very limited life
span and has no capacity to think or appreciate his or her surround-
ings and is only capable of experiencing unrelenting and excruciating
pain. In such a case, many people might think that non-existence
would be preferable to existence, particularly where heroic measures
were necessary to keep the patient alive.’ Even common sense and
medical experience may help us in this conceptual framework. For
irretrievably damaged human beings who have lost all higher cerebral
functions, curled up on a hospital bed with tubes and wires sustaining
and monitoring their vital functions, for people who suffer from con-
stant pain, from limitation of movement and sensation, from severe
impairment of the ability to interact with other people, life might be
worse than death (Savulescu, 2002). It may, however, be hard to
affirm that in mild to moderate intellectual disability non-existence is
better to life since a children with intellectual disability may live a hap-
py and worthwhile existence (Savulescu, 2002). On the other hand,
some people think that even Down’s syndrome constitutes a life not
worth living (Molenaar, 1992). When we are dealing with ethical con-
cerns of wrongful life claims, we must consider that evaluation of
quality of life. Whether life is worth living is difficult to assess on
objective grounds. Even if we acquiesce in the view that the absence
of pain and suffering, e.g. could be assumed as objective criteria to
evaluate the quality of life, as to when the threshold is crossed with
respect to whether life is or is not worth living, remains a difficult,
almost impossible question.
Wrongful life claims and medical
liability
Beyond the rich bioethical and philosophical debate on the metaphys-
ical question related to the comparison between existence and non-
existence, the practical reality of an injured child exists. The child will
experience pain and suffering during his/her lifetime and, depending
on his/her incapacity and dependence, will have to bear pecuniary
damages and losses for the high cost of medical and social care that
often accompanies severe impairments. Despite the general reluc-
tance of the courts all over the world to allow wrongful life claims,
many scholars and commentators have offered these arguments in
support of these torts, sustaining that wrongful birth and wrongful life
correspond closely, if not perfectly, to traditional negligence principles
and should be analysed under traditional negligence framework and tort
principles (Kelly, 1991; Belsky, 1993; Jackson, 1995; Caulfield, 2001).
As part of tort doctrine has outlined ‘the terms wrongful birth and
wrongful life are confusing because they seem to indicate a unique or
novel claim for relief, when they are merely tort claims sounding in
traditional negligence or medical malpractice. Wrongful birth is a mis-
nomer that does not identify the underlying tort as much as it unart-
fully describes the result of tort. The same conclusion is true for
wrongful life’ (Jankowski, 1989).
Consequently, in the midst of the robust debate surrounding
wrongful life claims, possible ramifications in the medical liability night-
mare deserve our close attention. The emergent technologies in the
field of PD raise expectations in parents that cannot always be met,
and unwittingly open the door to less straightforward challenges for
medical practitioners (Pattinson, 1999). All the issues surrounding
wrongful life claims raise a critical question: the physician does not
cause the disease or the defect in the child; rather it is the physician’s
failure to advise the mother/parents adequately, thereby depriving
them of the chance to make a fully informed decision, which is the
central core of the claims (Howlett et al., 2002).
In many wrongful life cases, the pertinent claim is that there has
been a problem with information or understanding by mother/par-
ents regarding the potential risks of having children with genetic or
congenital anomalies, the results of the tests performed, and finally
the accuracy of the tests themselves. Improvements in information
and consent practice are undoubtedly to be sought, particularly in
the light of developments of PD, and practitioners will need to main-
tain high standards of counselling to facilitate informed consent (Rafi
and Chitty, 2009), and offer the most appropriate prenatal test. In
other words, the Gordian knot is the physician’s ability to guide preg-
nant women towards a full understanding of the prenatal tests on
offer. Information and consent are not merely ethical challenges in
prenatal screening and diagnosis (de Jong et al., 2015), but key points
in avoiding malpractice claims (Localio et al., 1991; Beckman et al.,
1994; Hickson et al., 1994; Levinson et al., 1997; Brenner and
Bartholomew, 2005; de Reuver et al., 2008; Ricci et al., 2015). Key
points arise for physicians who are obliged to counsel and offer
screening for relatively common genetic diseases and for a standard
body of infectious disease, to offer evaluation for particular risks
related to race or age, and for specific risks related to personal, famil-
ial and medical history, and finally to correctly interpret and commu-
nicate the results of the tests performed (Klein and Mahoney, 2007).
As a consequence, a breach of duty occurs when the physicians
fails to utilize the most adequate prenatal diagnostic procedures, to
consider the family or personal history of the mother, to inquire into
the parents’ ethnicity or, finally, to interpret or communicate the
information. And this breach of duty may wrongfully cause suffering
in the life of the child.
Conclusions
There are many conceptual difficulties relating to bioethics and the law.
Conclusively, wrongful life suits are alleged to be predicated on the
devaluation of life with disability, i.e. that non-existence is preferable
to life with disability. The injury is therefore life with disability.
Wrongful life claims seek to compensate the child (the victim) by
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comparing his/her rightful condition had the defendant not acted
negligently, with her actual conditions of life. As we have seen above,
this comparison (where the alternative would be non-existence, the
termination of a pregnancy) draws the most bioethical and juridical
criticisms and is largely responsible for the fact that many courts,
internationally, deny the feasibility and the lawfulness of wrongful life
suits. The claim that non-existence is preferable to life with disability
stands as the major obstacle and is the main justification for the dis-
missal of many cases of wrongful life claims.
In wrongful birth claims, parents of the child bring their own claim
since they allege that a deed of medical negligence has led to the birth
of an unwanted, often disabled child. The child’s life is injurious to
them, since they are obliged to live with upbringing costs and the
duty of nursing a child who will not live a healthy life. However, unlike
wrongful life action, an action for wrongful birth seems not to imply a
conceptual parallel between the child’s life with a ‘handicap’ and non-
existence. In wrongful birth claims, parents seek lost earnings, child
rearing expenses, emotional distress damages and reimbursement for
the extraordinary expenses occasioned by the child’s disability.
Moreover, the injury of wrongful birth claims is sometimes referred
to in the literature as the deprivation of choice (Rinaldi, 2009), since
parents allege that they were unable to make fully informed choices
due to a lack of medical information. On this issue, according to
Hensel, it could be argued that wrongful life suits tend to be less suc-
cessful than wrongful birth claims because ‘in part … courts have
found it more palatable to identify lost parental choice as the injury
than to answer the metaphysical question of whether non-existence
is ever preferable to life, however burdened’ (Hensel, 2005). She
goes on: ‘the misleading rhetoric of choice and opportunity has
allowed the tort of wrongful birth to garner widespread legal recogni-
tion’ (Hensel, 2005). In wrongful birth claims, choice is not entirely
the issue and, once again borrowing words from Hensel ‘it is not lost
choice in the abstract that is actionable, but the lost opportunity to
abort the impaired child or to prevent conception.’ In this light,
wrongful birth claims may be ethically problematic. However, the
widespread perception that in wrongful birth claims what is at stake
is not the value of life (even when disabled) but the price that parents
have to pay for bringing up a disabled child, can explain why courts
faced with these issues have, generally, rejected wrongful life actions
while at the same time approving those for wrongful birth.
Claims relating to ‘wrongful life’ and ‘wrongful birth’ give rise to
two questions that are the subject of scientific, ethical and juridical
debate. Who is responsible for providing full and correct medical
information regarding a developing foetus with serious genetic and
congenital disease? Who has the right to receive compensation
when a child is born with such a disease (Frati et al., 2014). The
themes of ‘wrongful birth’ and ‘wrongful life’ are charged with per-
plexing ethical dilemmas (Dickens, 1985). They also raise delicate
legal questions (i.e. the existence of the right to be born only if
healthy or even not to be born at all). These have met, in various
countries and on certain occasions, with different solutions and have
triggered ethical and juridical debate, arriving at damage case scen-
arios resulting from a lack of information or diagnosis prior to the
birth which deprives the mother of the chance to terminate the
pregnancy. The two aspects (the choice of test offered to the
expectant mother and the obligation to inform) appear, therefore,
to be clearly separate. PD, as described in various documents
released by the major scientific bodies, ‘allows for the prevention of
the birth of an affected foetus and, where applicable, ensures the
best therapy to treat the affected foetus/newborn both in the
womb and at birth. Guidelines for genetic tests for PD try to strike a
balance between genetic risk, procedural risk and the cost of the
service. Disease risk assessment is the role of genetic counselling.
Numerous screening techniques are currently used to estimate the
risk of a couple having a child with chromosomal or genetic anomal-
ies’ (Italian Society of Ultrasound in Obstetrics and Gynecology,
2015). As for any other medical branch, the type of diagnostic tech-
nique used in PD must be appropriate to the type of pathology risk,
on the basis of clinical and anamnestic indications. There is no dis-
tinction, then, between a life worth and not worth living; instead
there is a strong emphasis on the asset of ‘health’, irrespective of
the quality of life itself and the subjective perceptions relating to it.
Health is understood as being ‘not only in the static dimension of
absence from illness, but a dynamic/functional condition of mental
and physical wellbeing,’ as the World Health Organization definition
suggests. The ‘tragedy’ of a particularly serious disability which is a
constitutive part of the child’s biography and will be for life, but in no
way undermines that child’s dignity as a human being, entitles the
child and all other family members involved to the fullest compensa-
tion. This is quite different from the case of damage to the unborn
child which cannot be directly linked to the physician’s conduct but
for which the compensation claim is based on that condition known
as ‘wrongful life’. This covers a range of different situations but par-
ticularly, for our interests here, those in which ‘damage’ might have
occurred because of the lack of PD, thus depriving the mother of
the chance to terminate the pregnancy. The resistance of such
events to a rigorous approach intensifies the associated ethical and
juridical issues and is reflected in the heightened doctrinal debate
which surrounds them. The principle established suggests new fron-
tiers for medical and obstetric decision-making. Clearly, the need to
weigh both the benefits and the potential risks of medical proce-
dures should not be disregarded. We would like to stress that the
duty to inform should be tempered by maternal desire. The role of
information assumes particularly complex meaning when the choice
of the mother affects others (the unborn baby or newborn, father,
siblings), including the physician whose conduct has influenced this
choice (Frati et al., 2014), and the whole society. This regards an
increasing number of cases in which the lack of, or wrong, informa-
tion regarding possible malformations or chromosomal anomalies of
the foetus have prevented the pregnant woman from exercising the
‘faculty’ of terminating her pregnancy, thus leading to the birth of a
child which is ‘unhealthy’.
Beyond the specific ethical concerns that both wrongful life and wrong-
ful birth claims evoke, damages proximately caused are differently ascer-
tainable in the two claims. A common trait of both wrongful birth and
wrongful life claims is that, unlike the traditional medical malpractice case
in which negligence directly affects the foetal condition, in these cases the
child is disabled or chronically ill regardless of the physician’s actions.
Wrongful life is more controversial because it identifies the impaired
child’s life as the operable injury, a concept hard to conceptualize; wrong-
ful birth, on the other hand, seems easier to judge because the injury
identified is the parents’ lost choice over the future of the pregnancy and
the costs and emotional burden of bearing a disabled child.
But this controversial story continues.
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